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The Auditors
Independence
Problem
Specific Rules Are Needed Concerning
Independence in Appearance

By Hans J. Dykxhoorn and Kathleen E. Sinning

In 1978 and 1979, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted
Accounting Series Release (ASR) Nos.
250 and 264 in response to critics of
the accounting profession who ex
pressed doubt that accounting firms
that provide non-audit services to their
audit clients can be truly independent
in their audit work. Neither release pro
hibited auditors from providing any
type of non-audit service but did re
quire disclosure of non-audit services
in proxy statements (ASR No. 250) and
presented relevant factors to be used
in evaluating the scope of services to
be performed by auditors (ASR No.
264).
As a result of the accounting profes
sion’s opposition to these releases,
ASR Nos. 264 and 250 were rescind
ed in August 1981 and January 1982,
respectively. The SEC stated that the
self-regulatory mechanism of the ac
counting profession “should be able to
generate sufficient information about
non-audit services to enable the Com
mission, the accounting profession
and other interested users to monitor
services performed by accountants.”1
The SEC feels that its role “should re
main one of oversight rather than
regulation.”2 However, cognizant that
the revocation of ASR Nos. 250 and
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264 might be considered a signal that
the SEC is less concerned with main
taining auditors’ independence, SEC
Commissioner Barbara Thomas re
marked that the withdrawal of ASR No.
250 “requires the Commission to
carefully monitor the effectiveness of
the AICPA’s rules in this area...we
must remain prepared to revisit this
area due to the critical need to main
tain the independence of auditors.”3
The SEC’s renewed confidence in
the accounting profession’s ability to
regulate itself is not unjustified. The
profession, through the American In
stitute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA), has had regulations, guide
lines, and rulings concerning the in
dependence status of auditors. The
increased responsibility for insuring
auditors’ complete independence
placed on the profession by the SEC,
however, is a heavier burden than it
appears. It will entail developing a set
of specific rules concerning indepen
dence in appearance. The balance of
this paper explains why.

Background
Certified Public Accountants (CPAs)
audit the financial statements of many
business entities in the United States.
Since the emergence of the SEC in
1934 and passage of the Securities Act

of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, all publicly owned corpor
ations under the jurisdiction of the SEC
must undergo mandatory annual
audits.
Even though the auditor is engaged
by his (or her) client to express an opin
ion on the client’s financial statements,
the auditor’s primary responsibility is
to those who use the financial state
ments in making investment or lending
decisions. The users rely on the
auditor’s opinion that the financial
statements present fairly the financial
position of the client, the results of its
operations, and the changes in its
financial position for the year ended.
Thus the audit function lends credibility
to financial statements. For this credi
bility to exist, however, the auditor
must be independent from his audit
clients.
The American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants has established
“independence in mental attitude” as
one of the generally accepted auditing
standards. In addition, the Ethics Com
mittee of the AICPA has promulgated
various independence requirements in
the Code of Ethics which is adopted by
all State Boards of Accountancy in the
United States.
The SEC also has an independence
requirement for CPAs as prescribed in
Regulation S-X as follows: “The Com
mission will not recognize any certified
public accountant or public accountant
as independent who is not in fact
independent.”4 The SEC periodically
issues guidelines for a number of
auditor-client relationships which it
believes would or would not render the
auditor independent as Accounting
Series Releases, such as ASRs No.
126 and 232. The AICPA does the
same for its members by issuing Ethics
Rulings that deal with auditor in
dependence, as do its counterparts at
the State level.

The Problem with Auditor
Independence
Despite the rule-making efforts of
the AICPA and the SEC, the auditing
profession has been exposed to criti
cism concerning its independence. Re
cent Congressional investigations of
the accounting profession were critical
of the self-regulatory efforts of the pro
fession and, to a lesser extent, of the
role the SEC has played.5 The Senate
study on the “accounting establish
ment,” a 1960 page analysis, was

especially concerned about the lack of
independence of the larger accounting
firms due to factors such as the prac
tice of providing management advisory
services (MAS) to audit clients. This
study pointed out that:
“Independent auditors must have the
complete confidence of the public for
whose benefit the Federal securities
laws were enacted. That confidence
can only be maintained by strict
adherence to standards of conduct
which assure the public that auditors
are truly independent and competent
to perform their responsibilities.’’6

The implication of this statement is
that any problem with independence is
caused by a failure to adhere to stan
dards of conduct and that auditors are
unethical and are providing audit ser
vices to clients from which they are not
independent. A major cause of the
independence problem, however, may
be the “standards of conduct” them
selves. The government study alludes
to this by its criticism of the selfregulatory effort of the profession
which includes the formulation of in
dependence rules. As the following
section will show, the independence
problem is caused not by unethical
auditors violating their Code of Ethics
and Generally Accepted Auditing Stan
dards but by the independence re
quirements themselves.

The Concept of Auditor
Independence
Independence consists of two com
ponents: independence in fact and
independence in appearance. The
auditor must be both in order to be
considered independent. Whereas in
dependence in fact deals with the
auditor’s state of mind or attitude
toward the audit object, independence
in appearance is dependent on how
others interpret the auditor’s indepen
dence. For an auditor to lack indepen
dence in appearance it is not
necessary that he or she lack in
dependence in fact; simply having his
or her independence questioned by a
legitimate third party is sufficient to
render the auditor not independent. It
seems that the requirement for in
dependence in appearance may be
the more stringent of the two re
quirements of what will be called “total
independence.” The effectiveness and
efficiency of two types of in
dependence rules — general and
specific rules — to ensure “total in
dependence” and how they relate to

each of the two components of the
independence concept are analyzed
below.

Independence in Fact
Independence in fact is a concept
which deals with an individual auditor’s
perception. It is generally agreed that
there cannot be any objectively meas
urable specific guidelines for in
dependence in fact that are also
operational. It is this component of the
“total independence” concept to
which the AICPA refers in its
Statements of Auditing Standards
which state that “the possession of in
trinsic independence is a matter of per
sonal quality rather than of rules that
formulate certain objective tests.”7
To ensure independence in fact in
all cases, all that is necessary is a
general rule mandating auditors’ in
dependence in fact such as the second
general auditing standard which man
dates that in “all matters relating to the
assignment, an independence in men
tal attitude is to be maintained by the
auditor or auditors.”8 Of course, the
implicit assumption is that all auditors
are ethical, that is, no auditor will
accept an audit engagement if he
believes that the audit cannot be ob
jectively and unbiasedly conducted.
Whether this assumption holds is an
empirical question that is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, there is
no reason to doubt that the U.S. ac
counting profession in general consists
of highly ethical and professional peo
ple. Unethical conduct seems to be the
rare exception that occurs in any pro
fessional group.
A rule making body could not devise
a set of uniform specific rules to apply
to all auditors to ensure independence
in fact because the rules would have
to be separately designed for each in
dividual auditor. The rules would have
to reflect each auditor’s independent
mental attitude toward each and every
possible auditor-client relationship.
Since no one can know an auditor’s
own mind as well as the auditor him
self, developing such a set of com
prehensive rules would be impossible.
Therefore, a general rule would be
most appropriate and is sufficient to
ensure independence in fact.
A general rule, however, is subject
to individual interpretation. Since per
ceptions of a general rule are bound to
differ for some persons, different audi
tors will arrive at different decisions
concerning acceptance or rejection of

Independence in appearance
deals with the collective
perceptions of users of
financial statements.

an audit engagement based on the cri
terion of independence in fact alone.
Thus, the general rule will result in
divergent interpretations in many
cases. Nonetheless, independence in
fact will have been achieved for all
auditors, assuming ethical behavior.

Independence in
Appearance
In contrast to independence in fact,
independence in appearance is a con
cept that deals with the collective
perceptions of users of financial state
ments. Independence in appearance
requires that an auditor must appear
to be independent to a third party.
Whether or not the auditor is indepen
dent in fact is not a concern of this
criterion.
In determining whether or not he is
independent in appearance, an auditor
could be guided by two types of rules:
A general rule which requires the
auditor to be independent in appear
ance, such as the Code of Ethics,9 and
specific rules10 which cover every type
of auditor-client relationship.
A general rule would require the
auditor to decline any audit engage
ment that would impair his or her
independence in appearance. The
auditor would have to judge each situa
tion when confronted with it to deter
mine if the general rule indicates that
he is not independent. Even if all
auditors are ethical, they may even
tually violate the general rule since
they are dealing with others’ percep
tions of their independence. They may
accept engagements that, unknown to
them, impair their independence in ap
pearance or decline engagements in
which third parties would actually view
them as independent.
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In sum, a general rule will not ensure
independence in appearance for all
situations. It is a sufficient rule only in
the extreme case where all auditor
client relationships are considered in
dependent in appearance or if it is
assumed that all auditors will interpret
the general independence in appear
ance rule correctly. A general rule deal
ing with the independence in ap
pearance requirement is not sufficient
because it may result in auditors ac
cepting audit engagements that should
not be accepted and rejecting
engagements that could have been
carried out.
If an auditor’s independence in ap
pearance decision is to be guided by
specific rules only, a complete set of
specific rules must be developed by a
rule making body and made known to
all auditors. A set of specific rules
alone would be sufficient to assure in
dependence in appearance for all audit
engagements because the auditor,
assumed to be ethical, would need
only to refer to these complete specific
rules to determine whether or not a
given auditor-client relationship would
render him not independent in appear
ance and thus, whether or not to ac
cept an engagement.
As a result of the above analyses,
it becomes apparent that the follow
ing conditions would be sufficient
to ensure an auditor’s “total inde
pendence:”
1. A general rule mandating inde
pendence in fact.
2. Specific rules concerning inde
pendence in appearance for all
auditor-client relationships.
3. Ethical auditor behavior, that is, an
auditor will decline any audit engage
ment which impairs his or her inde
pendence in fact and/or independence
in appearance.

Auditor-Client Relationships
Recent empirical research indicates
that there may be differences in the
perceptions of auditors’ independence
between auditors and certain groups
of financial statement users. Lavin11 in
vestigated the perceptions of auditors’
independence for a sample of CPAs,
bank loan officers, and financial
analysts of brokerage houses. In a mail
questionnaire, the sample subjects
were asked to indicate for each of
twelve different auditor-client relation
ships take from ASR No. 126 whether
they considered the auditors involved
to be independent or not independent.
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Lavin found that there were statistically
significant differences in the responses
of the three sample groups for six of
the twelve situations. In five of the six
situations significance was not caused
by one group considering the auditors
to be independent and the other
groups not but rather by the degree of
consensus between the three groups.
However, in the auditor client relation
ship in which an accounting firm pro
vided bookkeeping services for its
audit client, a majority of the CPAs
questioned considered the auditors to
lack independence while the two finan
cial statement user groups perceived
the auditors to be independent.
Imhoff12 conducted a survey which
included a similar sample group of
CPAs and financial statement users.
He investigated the perceived effect on
an accounting firm’s independence if
employees of their audit staff accepted
employment at companies that they
had previously audited. The results of
this study indicate that users are
somewhat more critical of CPAs ac
cepting positions with client firms than
are practicing CPAs.13
A study by Pearson and Ryans14
which investigated how practicing
CPAs, Chartered Financial Analysts,
and corporate accountants perceived
potential auditor-management con
flicts also found differences in percep
tions of auditor independence between
CPAs and non-CPAs for some situa
tions. Empirical research conducted in
Germany15 and the United Kingdom16
also indicate that differences between
auditors and financial statement users
may exist.
Although the conclusions of these
studies are limited to the auditor-client
relationships investigated, they indi
cate that problems may arise for the
auditing profession if no specific rules
are devised concerning independence
in appearance for those auditor-client
relationships in which differences ex
ist between the perceptions of auditors
and users of financial statements.
Admittedly, the problem exists only
if the users of financial statements take
a stricter view of the auditors’ in
dependence than the auditors. This
was not conclusively shown in the
Lavin study. The results obtained by
Imhoff and Pearson and Ryans seem
to indicate that users of financial
statements are more inclined to con
sider auditors’ independence to be im
paired than the auditors themselves.

These findings take on more signifi
cance since the studies included some
auditor-client relationships that have
not been properly addressed by the
SEC or AICPA such as auditors ac
cepting employment at companies
they are currently auditing or have
previously audited or the situation in
which an accounting firm received a
significant portion of its total revenue
from one audit client. Since these
auditor-client relationships have not
been addressed, there is very little
guidance available to the auditor and,
as a result, a risk that independence
in appearance may be violated.

The above analysis indicates that
the controversy surrounding auditors’
independence arises from having a
general requirement that auditors must
be independent in appearance and a
lack of specific rules. The solution,
thus, is to identify and prohibit all
auditor-client relationships for which
the consensus perceptions of users of
financial statements are that the audi
tors lack independence. The definition
of what represents consensus and who
represents users of financial statement
must be left to an appropriate rule
making body.
It seems unlikely, however, that the
rule making body will be able to devise
complete specific rules concerning
independence in appearance. To over
come the practical limitation of de
vising complete specific independence
in appearance rules, even though an
effort should be made toward com
prehensive coverage, the current
general requirement of independence
in appearance must be changed so
that it applies only to those auditor
client relationships prohibited by the
specific rules. In other words, an
auditor’s independence in appearance
would only be impaired if he violates
any of the specific rules. This will
eliminate the auditor’s present uncer
tainty in deciding whether he is in
dependent in appearance or not.
Thus, the task of ensuring indepen
dence in appearance rests with the ef
forts of the rule making body. Any
independence in appearance prob
lems that arise after the rule making
body has devised and published its
specific rules will be the result of the
unresponsiveness of the body in
reflecting the perceptions of financial
statement users. (Unethical auditors
can also create independence prob
lems. However, as mentioned earlier,

this is not a serious consideration.) The
rule making body should base its deci
sions on empirical research of the
perceptions of users.

Conclusions
Auditors must be independent in fact
and in appearance. A general rule re
quiring auditors to be independent in
fact is the only way to deal with this
component of the independence con
cept. However, a general rule requir
ing auditors to be independent in
appearance is not appropriate if
perceptions of auditor independence
differ between auditors and users of
financial statements. Some research
indicates that there are differences of
perceptions between these two
groups. Consequently, the possibility
exists that auditors may accept
engagements which may render them
not independent in appearance unless
there are specific rules prohibiting
such engagements. Thus the con
troversy surrounding auditor inde
pendence stems from the general
requirement that auditors must be
independent in appearance and the
lack of complete specific rules in
dicating which relationships will impair
their appearance of independence. To
solve the independence problem the
following changes should be
implemented:
1. A rule making body should devise
comprehensive specific rules pro
hibiting any auditor-client relation
ships which are considered by users
of financial statements to impair in
dependence in appearance, and
2. the requirement for independence
in appearance should be redefined so
that auditors could only be accused
of not being independent in appear
ance if they violated any of the
specific independence in appearance
rules.

Even with the best effort it is unlikely
that the proposed comprehensive
rules will be complete, that is, that they
will cover every possible auditor-client
relationship. Thus requirement (2) is
needed to eliminate the auditors’
uncertainty for situations where
specific rules are lacking concerning
independence in appearance. This,
however, shifts the burden of ensuring
independence in appearance to the
rule making body. As noted above, the
SEC is currently relying more on the
accounting profession’s self-regulating
effort. The profession could continue
to promulgate the more comprehen
sive specific rules through the Ethics

Committee of the AICPA. However, it
seems advisable to appoint a rule mak
ing body which will be independent of
the AICPA to gain the credibility of the
financial statement users. By limiting
the independence in appearance re
quirement to specific rules only, most
criticism of the lack of auditors’ inde
pendence in appearance is likely to
arise from a perceived inadequacy of
specific rules, or standards of conduct,
which is the responsibility of the rule
making body. Since actual lack of in
dependence in appearance will be
limited to violations of any specific
rules such misconduct could be dealt
with through disciplinary action. Ω
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